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Abstract: The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed the 
negative effects of the TBTF doctrine and the need to take measures to limit 
government intervention in cases of insolvency of systemically important 
banks. In the EU, such measures were taken mostly in the supervision of 
systemically important banks, the capital requirements, the capacity of banks 
to absorb losses by using domestic resources, and deposit gurantee schemes. 
The study focuses on the development of a financial safety net. Priority is 
given to deposit guarantee schemes, which are an essential component of the 
financial safety net. The evolution of deposit guarantee schemes is studied 
and an analysis of its impact on the TBTF doctrine is made. The survey has 
shown that the development of deposit insurance has contradictory effects on 
the TBTF doctrine.  
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Introduction 
 
he global financial crisis brings up the question of the size of banks 
and the need for measures to constrain the growth of the ‘too big to 
fail’ banks (TBTF banks). Despite the ‘conventional’ assumptions that 
TBTF banks create conditions for increase of the systemic risk, have less 
capital, are funded by less sustainable resources (have lower loan to deposit 
ratios), and engage in market operations rather than typical bank operations, 
these banks still have the advantages of offering economy-of-scale products 
and services, which cannot be matched and offered by smaller banks. Not a 
single study, however, gives a specific proposal of what the optimal size of a 
bank should be. Of course, some additional regulatory measures were taken 
with respect to the systemically important banks, such as additional capital 
T 
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buffers between global systemically important banks and systemically 
important banks at a national level (provided for by Basel III), restrictions on 
the market-oriented operations of banks (the Volcker rule in the USA), the 
Vickers report in Great Britain, the Liikanen report, as a result of which a 
draft regulation for the so-called structural reform of banks was developed1; 
additional requirements for global systemically important banks2 and for 
instruments to be used to recapitalize banks in their restructuring – TLAC 
(Total Loss Absorbing Capacity).  
The measures taken against systemically important banks focus mainly 
on increased requirements for transparency and disclosure of information, 
higher requirements for maintenance of instruments used to absorb losses 
(TLAC3), the establishment of a framework for bank restructuring, and the 
creation of a European Board for restructuring of systemically important 
banks in the Euro area. They aim to mitigate the negative effects, arising from 
the ‘Too Big to Fail’ doctrine (TBTF) and the use of taxpayers’ money to bail 
these banks out. The measures also aim to reduce the likelihood of 
systemically important banks to be bailed out by the state, to limit the hidden 
subsidy4, and to create uniform rules for restructuring them when their 
financial situation deteriorates and it is likely to be declared bankrupt. Last 
but not least, these measures are used to affect the incentives for banks to 
expand excessively. It should be noted, however, that some of the measures 
taken, such as the Single Supervisory Mechanism, in fact do not give solution 
                                                            
1 The Volcker rule is part of the Dodd-Frank Act. It prohibits proprietary trading 
within a bank holding company. The introduction of the ‘Volcker’ was scheduled to start in 
2015 and finish in 2018. The Vickers report in Great Britain was developed by the 
Independent Banking Commission, aiming to separate the ‘retail’ business of the banks from 
market-oriented operations and from the activities of a bank that are not performed in Europe. 
The report was adopted by the Parliament in December 2013 and provides that the 
requirement should be applied from 2019. The Liikanen report is a product of the activities of 
the so-called Working Group at a high level, established under the European Commission; it 
provides for a ban on proprietary trading with financial instruments. This prohibition is laid 
down in the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
regarding the structural measures to enhance the sustainability of the credit institutions in the 
EU as of January 2014. The report states that these measures take effect at the beginning of 
2017, but given that the Regulation has not been adopted by the EP yet and steps to its agreement 
have not been made, it is not possible that this measure is applied in the early 2017. 
2 Since 2013, the Financial Stability Board has been drawing up a list of global 
systemically important banks, which are defined as such on the basis of certain criteria. The 
list of global systemically important banks is updated on an annual basis and as of November 
21, 2016 it includes 30 banks. The list of systemically important banks is preserved 
unchanged as compared to 2015. 
3 Total Loss Absorbing Capacity /TLAC/. 
4 This subsidy finds expression mostly in reduced costs incurred when financing a bank.  
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to the TBTF problem and do not eliminate the incentives for banks to be ‘too 
big’.  
The present study examines the development of the financial safety 
net. It focuses on deposit guarantee schemes, which are one of its essential 
components. After the peak of the global financial crisis, a number of 
initiatives have been undertaken aiming to mitigate the negative effects 
arising from the TBTF doctrine. The evolution of deposit insurance has 
contradictory effects on the TBTF doctrine, although the initiated changes aim 
to enhance the credibility and stability of the banking system and to prevent 
bank panics. The impact of the development of the legal framework for 
deposit insurance after the peak of the 2007-2009 crisis is discussed, and its 
effect on the TBTF doctrine is studied.  
Problems arising from the TBTF doctrine and measures taken to 
mitigate the negative effects. Kumar and Lester (2014) point out in one of 
their studies that price advantages for systemically important banks, related to 
raising resources, can be attributed to other factors, not relating to the fact that 
the market perceives a bank as ‘too big to fail’. It should be noted that the 
above-cited authors based their studies on data for the US banking system as 
of 2012, i.e. it is assumed that their research takes into account the measures, 
taken to reduce the problems resulting from the TBTF doctrine (specifically 
for the USA it is the Vickers report and the unconventional measures taken by 
the Fed in 2008). An IMF report (2014) indicates that the measures taken to 
limit the negative effects of the TBTF doctrine affect the market and after the 
adoption of the Volcker rule and the Vickers report, there was an increase in 
the credit default swap spreads (CDS spreads) of global systemically 
important banks and a decrease in the values of ROE, which can be 
interpreted as not regarding these banks financial institutions with low risk by 
the market, due to the fact that the state would bail them out in case of 
deterioration of their financial situation and the likelihood of being declared 
bankrupt.  
Haldane (2010) evaluated the costs associated with providing support 
to the banking sector during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, as for 
the USA these costs were estimated at USD100 bn (<1% of the GDP) and for 
the UK – GBP20 bn (just over 1% of the GDP)5. In view of the profits of the 
banking sector for the EU, although negative values were observed for some 
of the largest banks during the crisis of 2007-2009, due mainly to the 
reclassification of risk exposures and to the raise of additional capital by some 
banks, the banking sector have made profits in recent years. Despite the tight 
                                                            
5 Comparing these data with the profit of the banking sector in the USA and in the 
UK, according to Haldane’s research, the profit of the banking sector at the end of 2009 in 
both countries was USD60 bn and GBP23 bn.  
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margins, given the enormous state support provided to the banks, quite logical 
are the new regulatory requirements for the sector in the area of supervision, 
restructuring of banks and deposit insurance, although they are associated 
with increased costs for the sector due to the need of establishing funds to 
restructure the banks, the contributions to the deposit guarantee fund, the 
requirements for maintaining certain instruments in bank balances to be used 
to recapitalize a bank through internal resources (bail-in), and the increase in 
the supervisory burden.  
Logical is the question whether it is necessary to develop special 
legislation specifically for systemically important banks that were bailed out 
by taxpayers’ money during the crisis, or these banks should be disciplined by 
the market. Depositors ‘discipline’ banks with risky behaviour by requiring 
higher interest rates on their deposits or by withdrawing them from risky 
banks. However, when a bank is perceived as ‘too big to fail’, depositors take 
into account that the state would intervene by providing support for this bank. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2014) proved that systemically important 
banks generate lower profits and attract resources at higher interest rates than 
other banks, so it is not beneficial to shareholders that a bank grows 
excessively, i.e. according to them, there are internal buffers that limit the 
excessive growth of a bank. Managers, however, are those who are interested 
in higher bonuses, and believe that the expansion of a bank has a positive 
image effect – the so called ‘principal-agent’ problem. Given the government 
support provided to systemically important banks in a number of countries 
during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, it can be argued that market 
discipline is not effective enough and does not prevent the creation of risky 
TBTF banks. This justifies the regulatory measures that were taken and makes 
them necessary, including those related to the financial safety net – especially 
in its component regarding the protection of bank depositors, which will be 
discussed in this study.  
After the global financial crisis, three main points related to the change 
in the regulatory framework in the field of deposit insurance can be outlined – 
the change in Directive 94/9 on deposit guarantee schemes in 2009, the 
development of the new Directive 49/2014 regarding deposit guarantee 
schemes and its transposition into national legislation of the member states in 
2015, and the proposal made in November 2015 for establishing a European 
deposit guarantee scheme, which at the time of conducting the present study is 
only a draft project.  
Deposit guarantee schemes are only part of the financial safety net and 
their role is regarded in the context of the other components of the net – the 
central bank as a lender of the highest instance, the supervision of banks and 
the guarantees provided to users of investment, insurance and pension 
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products6. Not all components of the financial safety net7, however, were 
equally affected and modified accordingly as a result of the global financial 
crisis with a view to the effect that respective measures would have to 
increase the credibility and stability of the financial sector. In view of the 
financial safety net components, the most significant changes were made in 
the field of deposit insurance and banking supervision, where the focus was 
on systemically important banks in the Euro area.  
The Financial Stability Board of 2011 prepared a list of the banks that 
are systemically important at a global level. This list is updated every year. As 
of November 21, 2016 these banks numbered 29. The chart below shows the 
share of assets of each of these banks to the GDP of the country where the 
head office of a bank is located. The higher values of this ratio for the 
European global systemically important banks give evidence of the need to 
take measures to limit the growth of these banks in Europe. In support of this 
statement, indicative are the high values of the ‘Total assets to GDP’ ratio, 
exceeding 90% of the GDP in banks with headquarters in France, Great 
Britain, Sweden, and Spain, unlike the banks of systemic importance globally 
with headquarters in the USA, Japan, and China. This explicates the adoption 
of a number of regulatory initiatives, aiming at the banking sector after 2010 – 
direct supervision by the ECB of systemically important banks in the Euro 
area (127 as of November 2016), the restructuring of these banks by a 
centralized European body, which is also expected to accumulate considerable 
resources, and higher requirements for the instruments to be used to 
recapitalize banks through internal resources in cases of restructuring 
(MREL).  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of systemically important banks in the 
Euro area by countries, as I would like to point out that the main criterion for 
banks to fall under the direct supervision of the ECB is the ‘size of the bank’  
                                                            
6 With regard to investment products, similar protection for deposit insurance exists, 
governed by Directive 97/9/EC regarding the compensation schemes for investors. This 
directive was created shortly after the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive in 1994 and 
provides protection of up to € 20,000 of the financial resources and the financial instruments 
of ‘small’ investors in cases of bankruptcy of an investment company (a bank or non-bank 
institution) where the investment intermediary is unable to repay its obligations to customers.  
7 In the summer of 2010, the European Commission submitted a proposal to amend 
Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on compensation schemes 
for investors, but this proposal has not been developed yet. In 2017, in regard to the REFIT 
initiative of the EC to eliminate the contradictions and duplications in the European 
legislation in the field of financial services and to reduce the regulatory burden, it is expected 
that the Directive will be reopened for discussion, which is mostly forced by the need to 
harmonize the maximum level of coverage of client assets in an investment company, as at 
the time of carrying out the present study this level is €20,000 as opposed to the maximum 
deposit guarantee, which is €100,000.  
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Figure 1. Total assets / GDP ratio for global systemically important banks 
as of 31.12.2015  
 
 
Source: 2015 annual reports for global systemically important banks, the World 
Bank, and own calculations. 
 
Figure 2. Number of systemically important banks in the Euro area  
as of November 2016 by countries  
 
 
Source: ECB. 
 
criterion – total assets exceeding €30 bn. Other criteria for banks to fall under 
the direct supervision of the ECB are the criteria for economic significance 
(the cumulative amount of a bank’s assets exceeds €5 bn and the value of its 
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assets is equivalent to at least 20% of the GDP of the country where the head 
office of a bank is located) and the criterion according to which a bank is 
among the three largest banks in a member state (this criterion is applicable 
especially for the new member states of the Euro area such as Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia)8. 
The role of deposit guarantee schemes is indisputable for the increase 
in the credibility of the banking system, the prevention of deposit outflows 
from banks and banking panic under conditions of a financial crisis. There is 
another aspect, however, namely that deposit guarantee schemes increase the 
moral hazard, since depositors and banks have been encouraged to take more 
risks because in announcing a bank insolvent, the scheme starts operating and 
guarantees the payment of deposits to protected depositors up to a certain 
level – the maximum guaranteed level of €100,000 and the so called 
temporary high balances on which the deposit guarantee can exceed €100,000 
(in Bulgaria the maximum amount that can be paid under the so-called 
temporary high balances is BGN 250,000 in accrdance with Art. 10 of The 
Law on Bank Deposit Guarantee). The availability of a maximum level of 
coverage and co-insurance limit to a certain extent the moral hazard, 
associated with the actions of depositors, making them sensitive to the risks 
that they would take, as at least, they carefully consider the aggregate 
balances in their deposit accounts in a bank to amount to the maximum level 
of protection provided by the scheme. On the other hand, banks, in the 
presence of a deposit guarantee scheme and higher credibility of the banking 
system, are encouraged to take more risks, including those resulting in 
increased expansion. Thus, in the context of the TBTF doctrine, the high 
levels of protection and the elimination of co-insurance stimulate the creation 
of ‘too big to fail’ banks. Below is the analysis of how changes in the 
European legislation, related to deposit insurance affect the TBTF doctrine.  
Development of deposit insurance and the TBTF doctrine: 
Directive 94/19 enabled a number of discretions by member states, mostly 
regarding the maximum level of deposit guarantee, the way of financing the 
schemes – ex-post or ex-ante, the basis on which the contribution rate is 
calculated, and the scope of the deposits, subject to protection. Given the 
information in a Report of the Financial Stability Board from 2010, it should 
                                                            
8 I would like to emphasize that the other two criteria for systemic importance of a 
bank – the direct financial assistance by the European Stability Mechanism /ESM/ and the 
implementation of significant cross-border activities with a minor application. Actually, there 
are no banks, receiving direct funding for recapitalization by the European Stability 
Mechanism and therefore falling, on the basis of this criterion, under the direct supervision of 
the ECB. In view of the second criterion – cross-border activities – only one Belgium bank and 
two Austrian banks fall under the direct supervision of the ECB on the basis of this criterion.  
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be noted that during the global financial crisis, the EU countries (as well as 
some other countries outside the EU – a total number of 48 jurisdictions 
worldwide) introduced some kind of higher protection for depositors, taking 
advantage of the opportunities for discretion, as in the majority of countries 
where such measures were introduced, they developed into measures of a 
permanent nature, i.e. they continued operating after the global financial 
crisis. Despite the timely and adequate expansion of deposit guarantees and 
the increased protection for depositors, a serious issue faced by policy makers 
was the question how long to apply the measures of a temporary nature, so as 
not deteriorating the credibility of the financial system. The table below 
shows the EU countries that have introduced additional protection for 
depositors and other measures to increase the credibility of the financial 
system, undertaken by the financial safety net during the global financial crisis9:  
 
Table 1. Measures undertaken by the financial safety net to counteract 
the negative effects during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 
 
Component of 
the financial 
safety net  
Measures undertaken during the global financial crisis 2007-
2009  
Measures 
undertaken by 
central banks  
Decreasing the minimum reserve requirements in order to increase 
bank liquidity (Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Romania), decreasing 
interest rates on discount loans (the Czech Republic, Romania), 
providing short-term liquidity support for banks (France, Hungary, 
Poland, the UK) , requirements for banks to increase Tier I capital 
as a proportion of the total capital of a bank (France, Greece), res-
trictions on the payment of dividends (Greece), introduction of 
credit opportunities (Hungary, the Netherlands, Italy).  
State guarantees  
Creating a public institution that encourages lending (France, Ger-
many), state guarantees on repo agreements of the Central Bank 
(the Czech Republic, Italy), creating a special institution to gua-
rantee the functioning of the interbank money market (Austria, Ire-
land, the Netherlands), providing capital support to raise the capi-
tal adequacy ratio (Hungary, Great Britain), providing guarantees 
on loans in foreign currency (Hungary), state guarantees on loans 
granted by the central bank (Italy) state guarantee on long-term 
liabilities of banks (Italy), guarantees on newly issued liabilities of 
banks (Spain), buying up illiquid, highly rated assets of the banks 
(Spain).  
                                                            
9 One should take into account that the changes in Directive 94/19 in 2009 in the EU 
member states eliminate the possibility for discretion at national level, regarding the 
maximum level of protection provided for depositors.  
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Capital 
injections  
Capital injections oriented to particular banks experiencing 
financial difficulties (Austria, Greece, Germany, the UK), 
increasing requirements for Tier I capital and capital injections to 
major national banks in order to stabilize the system (France, the 
Netherlands, the UK), nationalizing banks (Latvia, the UK), stated 
willingness by the Ministry of Finance to inject capital (Slovakia, 
Spain).  
Deposit 
guarantees 
Unlimited guarantee on deposits of individuals (Austria, Hungary), 
increasing the maximum guaranteed level of protection for SMEs 
(Austria), increasing the maximum level of protection for 
individuals and legal entities (Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia Romania, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK), 
eliminating co-insurance (the Czech Republic, Hungary), 
unlimited guarantees on deposits (Germany, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Ireland).  
 
The Directive on deposit guarantee schemes, amended in 2009, forced 
some important changes in deposit insurance in the EU, aiming to ensure that 
deposit insurance schemes in the EU work well and effectively implement 
their main functions, related to maintaining the financial stability and ensuring 
an adequate level of protection for depositors. The global financial crisis of 
2007-2009 proved that deposit guarantee schemes are important for 
maintaining financial stability. The main changes in the Directive on Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes of 2009 aimed to introduce a harmonized maximum level 
of protection of €100,000 to be applied by the schemes in the EU as of 
December 31, 2010, to eliminate co-insurance10 and to reduce delays in 
payouts to 20 working days11. The introduction of such a harmonized level 
                                                            
10 Directive 94/19 provided the maximum level of guarantee for depositors up to 
90% of the total amount of their deposits in a bank, but no more than €20,000. Co-insurance 
has a disciplinary effect and reduces moral hazard, as depositors take part of the risk of 
incurring losses on deposits in announcing a bank insolvent, hence the capacity to absorb 
such losses makes them more careful when choosing a bank/ banks, in which they deposit 
their funds and allocate their deposits among several banks.  
11 In my opinion, such harmonization was necessary because Directive 94/19 on 
deposit guarantee schemes actually introduced a minimum, not maximum harmonization 
requirements on the maximum guaranteed level of deposits, the way of financing schemes – 
ex ante or ex-post, and the scope of the scheme since by taking advantage of these minimum 
mandatory requirements that were introduced by the relevant national legislation, member 
states applied very different practices with regard to the maximum guaranteed level and the 
method of financing the schemes. Therefore, some member states created more favourable 
conditions for depositors’ insured funds with banks. Also, in some countries with ex-post 
funding schemes participants carried less burden in financing the schemes compared to other 
countries with ex-ante funding, where schemes accumulated considerable resources from 
participants and were able to ensure deposit payments even in bankruptcies of medium and 
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aims to more transparency, an increase in the credibility of deposit guarantee 
schemes and an increase in the credibility of the financial system at a national 
level by preventing shifts of large depositors between member states as a 
uniform maximum level of protection does not provide large depositors with 
incentives to transfer deposits between banks in different EU jurisdictions.  
Co-insurance was eliminated in order to increase the credibility of the 
banking system, which in a period of crisis was severely disturbed. In fact, for 
the period 2007-2009, 8 of the 12 EU member states which applied co-
insurance, practically eliminated it and provided protection to depositors up to 
the maximum level laid down in the national legislation12 prior to the 
introduction of Directive 2009/14 requirements. The high values of the Per 
capita GDP/ Maximum level of coverage ratio are an indicator of the level of 
protection provided by deposit guarantee schemes in a particular country. The 
figure below shows the levels of the ratio for 2015, as its greatest dynamics 
observed in the EU member states (Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
which also apply the provisions of the Directive), shows that a similar level in 
some countries is not sufficient, for example Luxembourg, Switzerland and 
Norway, where the values of the ratio are respectively 93.43%, 73.87% and 
68.81% as opposed to Bulgaria and Romania, where the coefficient is less 
than 10% (respectively 6.28% and 8.26%), i.e. in the latter two countries the 
deposit guarantee was excessive. This raises the question whether indeed it is 
appropriate to introduce harmonized maximum level of protection for 
depositors in the member states in view of the existing imbalance in their 
level of economic development which reflects in the levels of GDP and the 
average levels of deposits. The charts for Bulgaria below show that although 
the country has tended to increase the average cost of deposits since 2007, the 
average values are still extremely low compared to the maximum guarantee of 
BGN196 000 and the average levels of deposits in the EU (at the end of 2015 
the average deposit amount in Bulgaria amounted to BGN7205). Figure 4 
shows that depositors give an account of the increased values of the maximum 
level of protection for 2010, because since then there has been a steady trend 
to reduce the number of accounts, subject to a guarantee.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
large banks at a national level with the resources raised. The question of how to finance the 
schemes was not governed by the revised Directive in 2009.  
12 Given the information in the Joint Research Center (JCR) Report to the European 
Commission made in 2010, some EU countries stopped applying co-insurance in 2007-2009, 
prior to entry into force of the provisions of Directive 2009/14, namely the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Estonia, the Netherlands, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
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Figure 3. Per Capita GDP/Maximum Level of Coverage Ratio  
as of the end of 2015  
 
 
Source: The World Bank, Calculations by the author. 
 
Figure 4. Number of deposit accounts in Bulgaria subject to a guarantee 
and average deposit amount  
 
 
Source: Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund.  
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Figure 5. Accumulated funds in the Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund 
(BDGF) and annual contributions of banks  
 
 
Source: Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund. 
 
Figure 6. Guaranteed deposits and participants in the scheme 
 
 
Source: Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund. 
 
The increase in the maximum level of deposit insurance, provided by 
Directive 2009/14, on the one hand, reflected the real need to increase the 
maximum level, as 15 years have passed since the adoption of the first 
Directive in 1994 and a great number of member states have applied 
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significantly higher levels of protection, relevant to the real average income in 
a country and the average amount of funds deposited in a bank account13 (this 
can be seen in the chart above, where the values of the per capita GDP/ 
maximum level of coverage ratio for the old member states are within 40-
50%). At the same time, under conditions of the global financial crisis, the 
increase in the maximum level of protection was designed to increase the 
credibility of the banking sector and to prevent the outflow of deposits from 
banks. The destroyed credibility of the banking sector and the outflow of 
deposits from the banking system may have a negative effect on the real 
sector as regards the two channels of influence – credit intermediation and the 
payment system. It should also be taken into account that increasing the 
maximum level of deposit protection increases the contributions that banks 
make to a deposit guarantee scheme, which in turn affects the profitability of 
banks and is transferred to the cost of credit resources, thus raising the cost of 
the loan. The higher level of protection increases the likelihood of 
government intervention in declaring a bank insolvent and activation of 
deposit guarantee schemes, since the cumulative amount of deposits paid 
under the scheme can inflate the necessary available resources and it is 
possible that the scheme creates a shortage that would be covered by a credit, 
granted by the state. This problem is particularly valid in the bankruptcy of 
medium and large banks.  
The changes imposed by Directive 49/2014 in deposit insurance affect 
the scheme funding (ex-ante only) and the scope of guaranteed deposits. They 
also shorten the period of deposit payment in cases of withdrawal of a bank’s 
license within 7 days, reach the targeted level of the funds accumulated by the 
scheme which is bound by the amount of guaranteed deposits in the banking 
system, introduce risk-based contributions, and define temporary high 
balances of depositors in order to provide a higher level of protection. The 
Directive provides that contributions to the scheme are not only in the form of 
cash but also in the form of a commitment for payment, and that member 
states have the option to choose whether to use similar approach. This means 
that banks in some member states may not actually contribute to the scheme 
but have obligations to it in the form of commitments. These commitments 
must be well secured, for example by securities, and are characterized by 
procyclicality, i.e. they increase with a decrease in the economic business 
cycle.  
                                                            
13 Most major economies in the old member states have implemented a higher level 
of protection as opposed to the new member states, where the income per capita is 
significantly less and the maximum level of protection provided by Directive 94/19 is 
considered adequate and relevant to the average level of income.  
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The proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of a European 
deposit guarantee scheme, aims to create a scheme at a Euro area level that 
will interact with national schemes in the member states operating in 
accordance with the requirements of Directive 49/2014. The accumulation of 
funds in the European scheme to be used to pay deposits in cases of 
bankruptcies of banks in the Euro area is expected to happen gradually over 
time (in three stages). The first stage includes a phase of reinsurance, during 
which the European scheme will participate in the deposit payment process, 
when in announcing a bank insolvent at a national level, the accumulated 
resources from the national scheme is not sufficient for the payment of 
obligations to depositors of failed banks. During this phase, however, the 
European scheme would have accumulated sufficient resources (20% of the 
targeted level of 0.8% of the amount of guaranteed deposits) and its capacity 
to secure additional funding in case of resource depletion in the national 
scheme will be quite limited. However, the opportunity to raise additional 
funds from the European scheme in case of resource depletion in a national 
scheme would reduce the likelihood (or at least the amount of state 
participation) of government intervention in a bankruptcy of medium or large 
banks and the activation of the scheme (state participation is mostly expressed 
in the form of granting a credit). The second stage envisages joint 
participation of the schemes – the European and the national – in deposit 
payment with failed banks in a member state. The third stage envisages 
deposit payments to customers of a failed bank in the Eurozone to be made 
entirely under the European scheme. In creating a European scheme, 
additional funds from banks will not be accumulated to finance the European 
scheme. Resources will be redirected from national schemes, i.e. no bank will 
be loaded further, on the contrary, a centralized European body will 
accumulate contributions from a much larger number of participants. 
Therefore, it will be able to accumulate a lot more money than the national 
schemes and to cover obligations to depositors without government support 
(granting credits by the government or some other form of state participation), 
in case middle or large banks in the Eurozone go bankrupt.  
The framework for a European deposit guarantee scheme does not 
envisage obligatory lending between schemes at any stage until 2024, when in 
cases of failed banks in the Eurozone, deposits will be fully paid by the 
European scheme. This is so, since evaluating the effects of the creation of a 
European deposit guarantee scheme based on empirical analysis, conducted 
by the European Commission in 2016 covering the 3400 EU banks, 
representing 99.86% of the banking sector in the EU in 2013, proves that 
providing lending between banks covers at least the shortage of liquidity 
incurred by any of the schemes. Similarly, in cases of lending between 
Economic archive 1/2017 
 
29 
schemes, instead of supplementary insurance by one centralized body, such as 
the present proposal, the revenues from the collection of additional 
contributions and the income from national schemes at the time of its entry 
into subrogation are mainly used for repayment of credit obligations rather 
than for accumulating resources in the scheme, needed to increase its stability 
and the credibility of its capacity to guarantee adequate protection for 
depositors in declaring a bank insolvent.  
In fact, a valuable element in the framework, proposed for a European 
deposit guarantee scheme to be the third pillar of the banking union14 and to 
finalize its creation, are the additional resources which in cases of announcing 
a bank insolvent can be transfered to a particular national scheme, thus 
avoiding the necessity of obtaining a loan from the state, where the 
headquarters of the national scheme is located. All the three stages envisaged 
in the creation of a European scheme to protect deposits have their advantages 
and disadvantages. For example, the stage of additional insurance preserves 
the specifics of deposit insurance at a national level since the local scheme 
plays a leading role in the payment of deposits. However, participation in the 
European scheme is expected to be limited, as in the early periods of its 
creation it will not have accumulated sufficient resources. To prevent 
withdrawals of deposits from banks and the emergence of a bank panic, it is 
essential that payments of deposits start and are done shortly after announcing 
a bank insolvent. Directive 49/2014 provides that by 2024, when the targeted 
level of funds in a national deposit guarantee scheme of 0.8% of the total 
deposits in the banking system is reached, the term of deposit payments to be 
reduced to 7 working days. This concept of fast payouts within 7 working 
days is also laid out in the proposal for a Regulation for establishing a 
European deposit guarantee scheme.  
                                                            
14 The banking union is based on single banking supervision of systemically 
important banks in the Eurozone, uniform rules for the recovery and reconstruction of banks 
in the Euro area and harmonized rules on the payment of deposits in the EU. ECB is the 
European body that provides the supervision of systemically important banks in the Euro 
area. Decisions to restructure these banks are taken by another centralized body at European 
level – the European Board for Restructuring of banks. At the time of submitting this study 
for publication, no European body exists for guaranteeing deposits in systemically important 
banks in the Euro area. Please note that the proposal for a European deposit guarantee scheme 
provides for the establishment of such a European body and unlike the ECB and the European 
Board for Restructuring, whose prerogatives are supervision and restructuring of systemically 
important banks in the Euro area, the European deposit guarantee scheme provides cover not 
only for systemically important banks in the Euro area (127 as of November 2016), but also it 
could start operating in cases of failed banks from the Euro area, provided that the 
requirements of the proposed Regulation for establishing a European deposit guarantee 
schemes are complied with.  
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The different treatment of systemically important banks reflects in the 
target level of funds that are expected to be accumulated in national deposit 
guarantee schemes in compliance with the requirements of Directive 49/2014. 
The Directive provides for reaching a target level equal to 0.8% of the amount 
of guaranteed deposits in the banking system which should be reached 
gradually by 2024. However, the Directive makes it possible for some 
banking systems to apply a lower level of accumulated funds in the scheme of 
deposit insurance, which can be at least 0.5% of the total guaranteed deposits 
in the banking system. Using such a low level is possible for banking systems, 
dominated by systemically important banks for which, due to their systematic 
significance, high requirements for MREL (or respectively TLAC, if a bank is 
systemically important globally) are envisaged, and it is less likely a deposit 
guarantee scheme to be activated in those banking systems.  
I would like to point out that the framework for bank restructuring 
allows the use of certain tools to restructure a bank. Thus, the tool for sharing 
losses (bail-in) envisages restructuring to be done through the internal 
resources (liabilities) of a bank. To ensure sufficient availability of these 
tools, the Directive on the recovery and resolution of banks and investment 
intermediaries (more popular as BRRD) requires the restructuring body 
(nationally or the European restructuring authority) to define the MREL 
requirements. These requirements are expected to be higher for medium-sized 
and large banks, as MREL consists of two components – for absorbing losses 
and for recapitalization. For small banks, MREL values will be lower and will 
consist of only one component – for absorbing losses. Small banks do not 
carry systemic risk, they have a small number of depositors and with the 
activation of a deposit guarantee scheme it will have sufficient resources to 
compensate depositors (the footnote gives an example from the Bulgarian 
practice with the payment of deposits in the ‘International Bank for Trade and 
Development’ (IBTD) license withdrawal in 2005, the CCB in 2014 and the 
burden on the national deposit guarantee scheme15).  
                                                            
15 In the summer of 2005, the license of the ‘International Bank for Trade and 
Development’ AD was withdrawn, which is the 17th largest bank in the second group, 
according to the classification of the BNB Banking Supervision. In November 2014 the 
license of ‘Corporate Commercial Bank’ AD was withdrawn, which is the fourth largest bank 
in the first group. The amount of guaranteed deposits in the bankruptcy of IBTD amounted to 
BGN25,085, as with the bankruptcy of the bank, the funds accumulated in the Deposit 
Insurance Fund amounted to BGN300,963, i.e. much more than the necessary resources for 
deposit payment. The bankruptcy of IBTD created no tension among the public, as the 
disbursement of funds to depositors was easily made through the intermediation of only one 
bank. In the case of the CCB the things were radically different. The deposits amounted to 
BGN3.7 bn., as the accumulated funds in the DIF as of October 2014 amounted to BGN2.09 
bn., i.e. there was a shortage of funds in the scheme to cover payments to depositors so it was 
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Another important point that needs to be analyzed is the participation 
of deposit guarantee schemes in the restructuring process of banks which is 
provided by the Directive on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment intermediaries16 (BRRD). The main function of deposit 
guarantee schemes is the deposit payment to bank customers in the 
withdrawal of a bank’s license and declaring it bankrupt. At the same time, 
additiona functions of the schemes are envisaged in relation to bank 
restructuring (the regulation of this opportunity is laid out in Art. 106 of 
BRRD17), measures to prevent banks become insolvent (Art. 11 of Directive 
49/2014) and financial provision for the transfer of a bank’s deposit portfolio 
in order to maintain the access to guaranteed deposits by depositors in the 
process of a bankruptcy of banks. For large systemically important banks that 
meet the requirements for restructuring in accordance with the requirements 
of BRRD, it is possible, with the use of the bail-in tool, due to the size of the 
losses incurred by the bank, to use guaranteed deposits and the deposit 
gurantee scheme to cover these losses. We can conclude that the participation 
of national schemes would be possible with systemically important banks 
when using the loss coverage tool in cases of heavy losses, covered by 
depositors’ guarantee funds. Under the provisions of the Directive, however, 
depositors’ guarantee funds can be used in the process of bank restructuring 
only when there is evidence that losses suffered are lower than the losses that 
would be incurred in declaring a bank insolvent and the activation of the 
deposit guarantee scheme.   
The problem with covering guaranteed depositors’ temporary high 
account balances arises when funding the European deposit guarantee 
scheme. Temporary high balances are defined in Art. 6 Par. 2 of Directive 
49/2014 and include deposits of individuals, consisting of receipts from sales 
of property, proceeds related to social payments or the occurrence of certain 
life events, and insurance or social payments. Directive 49/2014 states only 
that guarantees on temporary high balances could be higher than €100,000 
and they are paid for a period of between 3 and 12 months. The cases when 
proceeds are recognized as temporary high balances are also mentioned. 
Actually, member states are given the opportunity for discretion in 
                                                                                                                                                          
covered by a state loan. Fig. 6 above shows the drop in the disposable funds of the scheme 
and its extreme shortage in the possible occurrence of an event leading to the payment of 
deposits.  
16 Both legal acts – Directive 49/2014 and Directive 59/2014 have been transposed 
into Bulgarian legislation in 2015 with the adoption of the Law on Bank Deposit Guarantee 
and the Law on the Recovery and Resolution of Credit institutions and Investment Firms.  
17 It envisages that a national deposit guarantee scheme would cover the claims of 
insured depositors if in the process of bank restructuring, guaranteed depositors’ funds are 
used for covering bank losses together with the bail-in tool.  
Economic archive 1/2017 
 
32 
determining the maximum guarantee on these deposits and conditions are 
created to observe a very different practice. For instance, some member states 
do not determine temporary high balances so they do not provide a deposit 
guarantee higher than the maximum guarantee of €100,000. Thus, after 2024, 
when the payment of deposits in the Euro area will be carried out by the 
European scheme, it is possible with its activation upon withdrawal of a 
bank’s license to reach a strong reduction in the resources of the scheme in 
countries, where customers maintain temporary high balances on certain 
accounts and the provided maximum level of guarantee on them is high (e.g. 
€250,000). This is especially valid in cases of bankruptcy of large banks, 
where the number of depositors is essential and considerable resources are 
paid with the activation of the guarantee schemes.  
The creation of a European deposit guarantee scheme should not 
increase the moral hazard. However, such impression is created, as the 
European scheme is envisaged to accumulate considerable resources from a 
multiple number of banks in the Euro area. Therefore, it could start paying off 
deposits in cases of bankruptcies of systemically important banks with a great 
number of depositors in the Euro area. It should be taken into account that the 
establishment of the scheme as a third pillar of the banking union is a 
precondition for banks, which have undergone evaluation of the quality of 
their assets and stress tests due to their participation in the single supervisory 
mechanism, to participate in it. Similarly, the system would be activated for 
systemically important banks that failed to apply the restructuring tools in 
accordance with the requirements of Directive 59/2014 and it possibly came 
to the use of resources from the European restructuring fund for a 
systemically important bank in the Eurozone. Actually, this means that the 
scheme would be activated in extremely rare cases, after exhausting all 
possible mechanisms to prevent the announcement of a bank insolvent.  
With regard to the participation of systemically important banks in the 
European deposit guarantee system, I would like to draw attention to the 
burden of the contributions which these banks will face. After 2024, the Euro 
area banks are envisaged to participate with contributions to the European 
scheme that will be set after taking into account the risk that banks run, and 
their relationship with other financial institutions, i.e. if banks are evaluated as 
more risky and their activity is bound up to a great extent with other banks, 
e.g with systemically important banks that perform multiple transactions of 
large amounts, these banks should be involved in the scheme with higher 
contributions. Systemically important banks in the Euro area are subject to 
direct supervision by the ECB, so they pay supervisory fees in compliance 
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with the Regulation 1024/201318 requirements, participate in the European 
restructuring board and contribute to the European restructuring fund in 
accordance with the Regulation 806/201419 requirements by paying a 
contribution set on the basis of the risk profile and the size of the bank in 
compliance with the guidelines of the European Banking authority. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the participation of systemically important banks in the 
three pillars of the banking union is associated with more expenses as 
compared to smaller banks, i.e. systemically important banks pay the price for 
what that are.  
The European deposit guarantee scheme could serve as a distribution 
channel for spreading the ‘contamination’ from one member state to another. 
As mentioned above, an impression is conveyed that the scheme creates 
preconditions for increasing the moral hazard, especially given that under the 
proposal to create an European scheme after 2024, the payment of deposits in 
a member state of the Eurozone20, in case of withdrawal of a bank’s license, is 
expected to be carried out only with the accumulated funds from the European 
scheme. Guaranteed deposit payments, made by the European scheme (in 
which all banks in the Euro area contribute to), rather than by national 
schemes, dilute the responsibility, for example of the national supervisors, 
local banks and local depositors, because it is believed that the European 
scheme will have sufficient resources to pay deposits in cases of bankruptcies 
of medium and large banks with a great number of depositors. This 
contradicts to some extent to the concept of the financial safety net – namely, 
to enhance the credibility and stability of the financial sector.  
The scope of the European deposit guarantee scheme includes, unlike 
the single supervisory mechanism and the single resolution mechanism, not 
only systemically important banks in the Euro area, but also all banks in the 
Euro area defined as credit institution by the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR). It is envisiged the European deposit guarantee scheme to include the 
credit unions and third country branches. Credit unions are not defined as a 
                                                            
18 Art. 30 of Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 for awarding the European 
Central Bank specific tasks, regarding the policies related to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions. 
19 Art. 70 of Regulation 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and uniform procedure 
for the restructuring of credit institutions and certain investment intermediaries within the 
Single Resolution Mechanism and the Single Resolution Fund.  
20 I would like to point out that simply referring to the Euro area member states is not 
enough correct, so we should explain that only Euro area member states participate in the 
Banking Union at the time of finalizing the present research. However, each EU member state 
outside the Euro area could use the opt-in opportunity, i.e. to join the Banking Union and 
participate in its three pillars – SSM, SRM and EDIS. By the end of 2016, no member state of 
the EU outside the Euro area has taken advantage of this opportunity.  
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credit institution in accordance with the Capital Requirements Regulation, 
while the third country branches in the EU member states and the national 
deposit guarantee schemes usually sign additional agreements for 
participation in the national schemes. Credit unions and third party branches 
have a small number of depositors and are not of systemic importance21. A 
potential bankruptcy of a credit union or a third country branch would not 
impede the payment of guaranteed deposits by a national scheme, so I do 
think that their inclusion in the scope of the European scheme is not 
necessary.  
The proposal to create an European deposit guarantee scheme 
primarily focuses on the activation of the scheme upon withdrawal of a bank’s 
license in the Euro area, rather than on preventive measures and the 
possibility that the scheme might interfere with banks, experiencing financial 
difficulties. The possibility of preventive measures taken by the national 
deposit guarantee schemes, however, is included in the context of the 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and is mostly 
reflected in the European Banking Authority guidelines on calculating MREL, 
namely, that large, systemically important banks and medium-sized banks will 
be restructured, while small banks would rather apply the procedure of a 
bankruptcy. The possibility of alternative measures undertaken by national 
deposit guarantees schemes gives ‘a chance’ for not systemically important 
banks to be bailed out rather than be directly declared insolvent. However, 
funds from contributions of banks to the European scheme will be managed 
by the European resolution fund, which also collects and manages 
restructuring contributions, gathered by the banks falling within the scope of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
Conclusion: The creation of a European deposit guarantee scheme is a 
natural continuation of the measures undertaken to enhance the credibility of 
the banking system after the global financial crisis and to prevent the use of 
taxpayers’ money to bail out banks which due to their poor financial situation 
might be declared bankrupt. The European scheme is envisaged to accumulate 
much larger resource than the national schemes, formed by the contributions 
of all banks in the Euro area, thus increasing the level of protection for 
                                                            
21 As an exception to this rule I would like to point out the case with the branch of 
the Icelandic bank Landsbanki in the UK, which had accumulated a serious resource by 
English depositors via the Internet. After the withdrawal of its license the guaranteed deposits 
of British depositors had to be paid by the Icelandic deposit guarantee scheme. Actually, this 
did not happen, since the Icelandic scheme did not have enough resources to do so and 
eventually, deposits of British depositors were paid by the English scheme in compliance with 
the requirements of the then legislation of the country. Of course, Iceland ‘paid’ the price, for 
the UK imposed such restrictions on the small Nordic country that are only applied to terrorist 
organizations and countries associated with terrorist networks.  
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depositors, which in terms of the operation of a national scheme might be 
undermined in cases of insufficient resources in the national scheme, 
especially in the bankruptcy of a major bank with a great number of 
depositors.  
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009, showed the negative effects 
of the TBTF doctrine and the need to take measures to limit its negative 
effects. In the EU, such measures were taken mostly in regard with the 
supervision of systemically important banks, the capital requirements and the 
capacity of a bank to absorb losses by using domestic resources in its 
restructuring. Systemically important banks have already paid a higher price 
due to the systemic importance they have, and that price finds expression in 
supervisory charges, performance evaluation of asset quality and stress tests 
(more stringent requirements for provisioning, audit fees), higher 
requirements for own funds to absorb losses (MREL and TLAC), higher 
capital buffers, and higher contributions to bank resolution funds and deposit 
guarantee schemes.  
Despite all these measures aimed to systemically important banks, the 
financial safety net with its most important component – deposit insurance – 
plays a key a role in mitigating the negative effects of the TBTF doctrine. 
Studying the development of the European legal framework in the field of 
deposit insurance in the EU, we can conclude that changes in the framework 
for deposit guarantee schemes have contradictory effect on the TBTF 
doctrine. These contradictions are as follows:  
First, the higher maximum levels of protection and the elimination of 
co-insurance have a beneficial effect on the credibility of the banking system, 
help to prevent the outflow of deposits and the emergence of a bank panic, but 
at the same time they encourage depositors to exhibit more risky behaviour. 
Also, the high levels of maximum deposit guarantees lead to an upward 
revision of the resources which deposit guarantee schemes must accumulate 
in order to be able to pay guaranteed deposits. This greatly increases the 
amount of resources that needs to be accumulated and paid in cases of 
bankruptcies of systemically important banks, making government 
intervention unconditional in similar cases of a bankruptcy. The negative 
effect will be reduced over time by reaching the required levels set as a 
percentage of the amount of guaranteed deposits in the accumulation of 
resources by the schemes.  
Second, the higher guarantees on temporary high account balances in 
some banking systems can lead to depletion of the resources in deposit 
guarantee schemes in the presence of a great number of such deposits which 
can force government intervention to cover the shortage in the scheme.  
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Third, the opportunities, provided by BRRD for deposit guarantee 
schemes to participate with accumulated resources in covering guaranteed 
depositors’ funds, after they had been used to cover particularly large losses in 
the process of restructuring a bank, mostly when it comes to systemically 
important banks, increase the possibilities of using the resources of a bank in 
the process of its restructuring as well as the possibility for bailing it out by 
domestic resources rather than by taxpayers’ money.  
Fourth, the creation of a European deposit guarantee scheme will be a 
precondition for the accumulation of significant resources by an institutional 
body that will have the capacity to cover the claims of insured depositors even 
in cases of bankruptcies of systemically important banks.  
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